"2. Έκαστος κατά την διάγνωσιν των αστικών αυτού δικαιωμάτων και υποχρεώσεων ή οιασδήποτε κατ΄αυτού ποινικής κατηγορίας, δικαιούται ανεπηρεάστου, δημοσίας ακροαματικής διαδικασίας εντός ευλόγου χρόνου, ενώπιον ανεξαρτήτου, αμερολήπτου και αρμοδίου δικαστηρίου ιδρυομένου διά νόμου.

3. Έκαστος έχει το δικαίωμα:

............................................................................................"

"1. Παν πρόσωπον έχει δικαίωμα όπως η υπόθεσίς του δικασθή δικαίως, δημοσία και εντός λογικής προθεσμίας, υπό ανεξαρτήτου και αμερολήπτου δικαστηρίου, νομίμως λειτουργούντος, το οποίον θα αποφασίση είτε επί των αμφισβητήσεων επί των δικαιωμάτων και υποχρεώσεών του αστικής φύσεως, είτε επί του βασίμου πάσης εναντίον του κατηγορίας ποινικής φύσεως. Η απόφασις δέον να εκδοθή δημοσία, η είσοδος όμως εις την αίθουσαν των συνεδριάσεων δύναται να απαγορευθή εις τον τύπον και το κοινόν, καθ΄όλην ή μέρος της διάρκειας της δίκης προς το συμφέρον της ηθικής, της δημοσίας τάξεως ή της εθνικής ασφαλείας εν δημοκρατική κοινωνία όταν τούτο ενδείκνυται υπό των συμφερόντων των ανηλίκων ή της ιδιωτικής ζωής των διαδίκων, ή εν τω κρινομένω υπό του Δικαστηρίου ως απολύτως αναγκαίου μέτρω, όταν υπό ειδικάς συνθήκας η δημοσιότης θα ηδύνατο να παραβλάψη τα συμφέροντα της δικαιοσύνης.

2. ..........................................................................................

3. Ειδικώτερον, πας κατηγορούμενος έχει δικαίωμα:

"Γιατί λοιπόν είναι τόσο σημαντική η προδικαστική αποκάλυψη; Διότι αποσκοπεί ακριβώς στην κατά το δυνατό εκ των προτέρων αποφυγή κακοδικίας, που η εμπειρία του κοινοδικαίου επιβεβαιώνει ότι δυστυχώς μπορεί άλλως να συμβεί ακόμα και χωρίς πρόθεση ή και πρότερη συνειδητοποίηση, παρά στην εκ των υστέρων διόρθωση της όταν αυτή διαπιστώνεται επ΄εφέσει όταν πλέον είναι πολύ αργά και όταν ούτε μια νέα δίκη ούτε ο παραμερισμός της καταδίκης μπορούν να θεωρηθούν σαν ιδανικές λύσεις. Από αυτή την άποψη, θα ήταν και αντιφατικό για τα Δικαστήρια από τη μια να αναγνωρίζουν τη δυνατότητα κακοδικίας αν δεν γίνει σωστή αποκάλυψη και από την άλλη να μην αναγνωρίζουν το δικαίωμα προδικαστικής αποκάλυψης και να κρίνουν το πράγμα μόνο εκ των υστέρων υπό μορφή έφεσης. Αρνούμαστε να πιστεύουμε ότι το νομικό μας σύστημα, εδραζόμενο τόσο στη θεμελιακότητα του Συντάγματος όσο και στη σοφία και την κοινή λογική του κοινοδικαίου, δεν παρέχει τη δυνατότητα στα Δικαστήρια, στα πλαίσια του συνταγματικού τους ρόλου αλλά και των συμφυών εξουσιών τους, να διασφαλίσουν, μέσω της προδικαστικής αποκάλυψης, ότι ο κίνδυνος κακοδικίας περιορίζεται στο ελάχιστο δυνατό, παρά να αναμένουν μέχρις ότου εκδηλωθεί η κακοδικία για να την αναγνωρίσουν, αφού κάτι τέτοιο θα ισοδυναμούσε ουσιαστικά με αποφυγή της ευθύνης τους στον κρίσιμο χρόνο αλλά και συνέργεια στην κακοδικία. Η έγκαιρη αποκάλυψη της πλήρους αλήθειας σε καθεστώς συνειδητής διαφάνειας δεν μπορεί παρά να είναι προς το ύψιστο δημόσιο συμφέρον της απονομής της δικαιοσύνης.

"Λαμβανομένης υπόψη τόσο της αντίστοιχης ευρωπαϊκής προσέγγισης στο Άρθρο 6 της Σύμβασης όσο και της γενικότερης προσέγγισης του Ανωτάτου Δικαστηρίου στο ρόλο του Δικαστηρίου όσον αφορά τη διασφάλιση των θεμελιωδών δικαιωμάτων, περιλαμβανομένων εκείνων κατηγορουμένου προσώπου, καταλήγουμε στο συμπέρασμα ότι τόσο από της απόψεως του Άρθρου 6.1 και 6.3(β) της Σύμβασης, όσο και από της απόψεως των Άρθρων 12.5(β) και 30.2 του Συντάγματος, ο κατηγορούμενος έχει δικαίωμα προδικαστικής αποκάλυψης όλης της σχετικής μαρτυρίας η οποία βρίσκεται στην κατοχή των διωκτικών αρχών. Η έκταση του δικαιώματος αυτού είναι ουσιαστικά ταυτόσημη με την αντίστοιχη θέση του κοινοδικαίου, με ιδιαίτερη αναφορά στο κριτήριο της σχετικότητας, όπως προκύπτει ευθέως από την παρατεθείσα ευρωπαϊκή νομολογία η οποία και παραπέμπει σε όλη τη μαρτυρία που είναι σχετική."

α) Το Κακουργιοδικείο Λευκωσίας εκδίδοντας το εν λόγω διάταγμα (Παράρτημα Α) και/ή απόφαση (Παράρτημα Β) υπερέβη την εξουσία και/ή δικαιοδοσία του καθότι-

(β) Το Κακουργιοδικείο Λευκωσίας ενήργησε με νομικό σφάλμα εμφανές στην ίδια την απόφαση ημερομηνίας 19.3.98 (Παράρτημα Β) και/ή στο διάταγμα ημερομηνίας 19.3.98 (Παράρτημα Α) καθότι η απόφαση για έκδοση του διατάγματος προκύπτει από την εσφαλμένη νομικά θέση ότι η Κατηγορούσα Αρχή έχει νομική υποχρέωση εν πάση περιπτώσει να προβεί στις ενέργειες που κατονομάζονται στο διάταγμα."

"... Αυτό δε που είναι σοβαρότερο, και αγγίζει απ΄ευθείας το ζήτημα που μας απασχολεί, το βρίσκουμε στις παραγράφους 3 και 4 της πιο πάνω απόφασης, στη σελ. 244:

"... Η εμβέλεια του προνομιακού εντάλματος certiorari, όπως την αναγνώρισε τελικά η σύγχρονη αγγλική νομολογία, παρέχει δυνατότητα για άσκηση ελέγχου από ανώτερο προς κατώτερο δικαστήριο - όχι όμως αναθεώρηση της ορθότητας της απόφασης του κατώτερου δικαστηρίου - με προοπτική την επέμβαση, είτε όπου το κατώτερο δικαστήριο ενήργησε εκτός της δικαιοδοσίας του ή την υπερέβη είτε όπου προκύπτει στην όψη του "πρακτικού" της απόφανσης του κατώτερου δικαστηρίου προφανές νομικό λάθος έστω και αν αυτό δεν άπτεται της δικαιοδοσίας."

"3. ΄Εκαστος έχει το δικαίωμα:

........................................................................................

(β) να προβάλη τους ισχυρισμούς αυτού ενώπιον του δικαστηρίου και να έχη χρόνον επαρκή δια την προπαρασκευήν τούτων,

......................................................................."

3. Ειδικώτερον, πας κατηγορούμενος έχει δικαίωμα:

(α)............................................................................

"3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

................................................................................

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;

(c) ...................................................................................

(d) .................................................................................."

"everyone who is a party to ...... proceedings should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case to the court under conditions which do not place him at a substantial disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent ...."

"As regards the interpretation of the term "facilities", the Commission notes firstly that in any criminal proceedings brought by a state authority, the prosecution has at its disposal, to back the accusation, facilities deriving from its powers of investigation supported by judicial and police machinery with considerable technical resources and means of coercion. It is in order to establish equality, as far as possible, between the prosecution and the defence that national legislation in most countries entrusts the preliminary investigation to a member of the judiciary or, if it entrusts the investigation to the Public Prosecutor's Department, instructs the latter to gather evidence in favour of the accused as well as evidence against him. It is also, and above all, to establish that same equality that the "rights of the defence", of which Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Convention gives a non-exhaustive list, have been instituted. The Commission has already had occasion to point out that the so-called "equality of arms" principle could be based not only on Article 6, paragraph 1 but also on Article 6, paragraph 3, especially sub-paragraph (b) (Applications Nos. 524/59 and 617/59, Ofner and Hopfinger, Report of the Commission para. 46; Applications Nos. 596/59 and 789/60, Pataki and Dunshirn against Austria, Report of the Commission, para. 36).

56. In particular, the Commission takes the view that the "facilities" which everyone charged with a criminal offence should enjoy include the opportunity to acquaint himself, for the purposes of preparing his defence, with the results of investigations carried out throughout the proceedings. Furthermore, the Commission has already recognised that although a right of access to the prosecution file is not expressly guaranteed by the Convention, such a right can be inferred from Article 6, paragraph 3(b) (see, by implication: Application No. 1816/63, Yearbook 7, p. 205, 211; Application No. 7412/76, Haase against the Federal Republic of Germany, Report of the Commission, paras. 115-117, D.R. 11, p. 78, 108). It matters little, moreover, by whom and when the investigations are ordered or under whose authority they are carried out. In view of the diversity of legal systems existing in the states parties to the convention the Commission cannot restrict the scope of the term "facilities" to acts carried out during certain specified phases of the proceedings, e.g. the preliminary investigation. Close scrutiny of the position of the Public Prosecutor's Department and of any obligations of impartiality imposed on it by national law would therefore be superfluous in the instant case. Any investigations it causes to be carried out in connection with criminal proceedings and the findings thereof consequently form part of the "facilities" within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph 3(b) of the Convention.

1. The "special folder" kept by the Public Prosecutor's Office.

59. The parties do not dispute that, in a criminal case, the Public Prosecutor's Department can legitimately keep a file containing personal notes and internal correspondence .......................................

The Commission stresses that if the "special folder" contains relevant items which could enable the accused to exonerate himself or have his sentence reduced, failure to make those items available to the defence for inspection would constitute a refusal of facilities necessary for the preparation of the defence and, therefore, a violation of the right guaranteed in Article 6, paragraph 3(b).

"...... the rule in R v Bryant can no longer be regarded as laying down the proper practice.

The rule was formulated by the Court of Appeal in 1946, a considerable time before recent developments in the common law relating to disclosure, and it is difficult to reconcile the rule with the emphasis which the modern cases place on the duty of the prosecution to disclose all relevant material which may assist the defence, subject to the exception, expressly recognised in the modern cases, of the public interest immunity.".

"(1) The prosecution's duty at common law to disclose to the defence all relevant material, ie evidence which tended either to weaken the prosecution case or to strengthen the defence case, required the police to disclose to the prosecution all witness statements and the prosecution to supply copies of such witness statements to the defence or to allow them to inspect the statements and make copies unless there were good reasons for not doing so. Furthermore, the prosecution were under a duty, which continued during the pre-trial period and throughout the trial, to disclose to the defence all relevant scientific material, whether it strengthened or weakened the prosecution case or assisted the defence case and whether or not the defence made a specific request for disclosure. Pursuant to that duty the prosecution were required to make available the records of all relevant experiments and tests carried out by expert witnesses. Furthermore, an expert witness who had carried out or knew of experiments or tests which tended to cast doubt on the opinion he was expressing was under a clear obligation to bring the records of such experiments and tests to the attention of the solicitor who was instructing him so that they might be disclosed to the other party. On the facts, the non-disclosure of notes of some interviews by the police to the Director of Public Prosecutions, the non-disclosure of certain material by the Director of Public Prosecutions, and prosecuting counsel to the defence and the non-disclosure by forensic scientists employed by the Crown of the results of certain tests carried out by them which threw doubt on the scientific evidence put forward by the Crown at the trial cumulatively amounted to a material irregularity which, on its own, undoubtedly required the appellant's conviction to be quashed. Furthermore, the fresh scientific evidence available to the court was such that the scientific case against the appellant was insupportable and that further rendered her conviction unsafe and unsatisfactory .........).".

It follows that if the irregularity is 'material', then for this reason alone the appeal must be allowed unless the proviso applies. In the sentence immediately following the passage which we have quoted from R v Maguire the court said:

We share this expectation. The obligation to disclose only arises in relation to evidence which is or may be material in relation to the issues which are expected to arise, or which unexpectedly do arise, in the course of the trial. If the evidence is or may be material in this sense, then its non-disclosure is likely to constitute a material irregularity. The proviso makes it plain that 'material' means something less than 'crusial', because it contemplates that although there may have been a material irregularity, yet a verdict of 'guilty' can be upheld on the ground that it involves no miscarriage of justice.".

That statement reflects the position in 1974 no less than today. We would emphasise that 'all relevant evidence of help to an accused' is not limited to evidence which will obviously advance the accused's case. It is of help to the accused to have the opportunity of considering all the material evidence which the prosecution have gathered, and from which the prosecution have made their own selection of evidence to be led. We believe that in practice the importance of disclosing unused material has been much more clearly recognised by prosecutors since the publication of the Attorney General's guidelines. The current Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (1991) Annexe H 'Written standards for the conduct of professional work, Standards applicable to criminal cases', para 1.2, reflecting the words of Lawton LJ which we have quoted, provides:

.........................................................................................................

..... Quite apart from statutory limitations on the disclosure of information, the common law has always recognised that the public interest might require relevant evidence to be withheld from the defendant. Obvious examples are evidence dealing with matters of national security, or disclosing the identity of an informant.".

"What are the lessons to be learnt from this miscarriage of justice? The law is of necessity concerned with practical affairs, and it cannot effectively guard against all the failings of those who play a part in the criminal justice system. But that sombre realism does not relieve us, as judges, from persevering in the task to ensure that the law, practice and methods of trial should be developed so as to reduce the risk of conviction of the innocent to an absolute minimum. At the same time we are very much alive to the fact that, although the avoidance of the conviction of the innocent must unquestionably be the primary consideration, the public interest would not be served by a multiplicity of rules which merely impede effective law enforcement. ....................

.........................................................................................................

The new rules are helpful. But it is a misconception to regard them as exhaustive: they do not in any way supplant or detract from the prosecution's general duty of disclosure in respect of scientific evidence. That duty exists irrespective of any request by the defence. It is also not limited to documentation on which the opinion or findings of an expert is based. It extends to anything which may arguably assist the defence. It is therefore wider in scope than the rule. Moreover, it is a positive duty, which in the context of scientific evidence obliges the prosecution to make full and proper inquiries from forensic scientists in order to ascertain whether there is discoverable material. Given the undoubted inequality as between prosecution and defence in access to forensic scientists, we regard it as of paramount importance that the common law duty of disclosure, as we have explained it, should be appreciated by those who prosecute and defend in criminal cases. And, If difficulties arise in a particular case, the court must be the final judge.".

"The common law duty of disclosure

"I agree with the view which was taken in the Court of Appeal that the phrase 'an issue in the case' must be given a broad interpretation. The same may be said of the phrase 'all relevant evidence of help to an accused' in the passage from Lawton LJ's judgment in R v Hennessey (1978) 68 Cr App R 419 at 426 which was adopted in R v Ward [1993] 2 All ER 577 at 601, [1993] 1 WLR 619 at 645. But the common law rules are concerned essentially with the disclosure of material which has been gathered by the police and the prosecution in the course of the investigation process for use in the case to be made for the Crown. In the course of that process issues of fact will have been identified which may assist or undermine the Crown case. The prosecution is not obliged to lead evidence which may undermine the Crown case but fairness requires that material in its possession which may undermine the Crown case is disclosed to the defence. The investigation process will also require an inquiry into material which may affect the credibility of potential Crown witnesses. Here again, the prosecution is not obliged to lead the evidence of witnesses who are likely in its opinion to be regarded by the judge or jury as incredible or unreliable. Yet fairness requires that material in its possession which may cast doubt on the credibility or reliability of those witnesses whom it chooses to lead must be disclosed. The question whether one or more of the Crown witnesses is credible or reliable is frequently one of the most important 'issues' in the case although the material which bears upon it may be, as Steyn LJ (at 1607) observed, collateral.".

"I would be inclined to attach less weight to the practical problems than that which was given to them by the Court of Appeal. If fairness demands disclosure, then a way of ensuring that disclosure will be made must be found. But it is a fact that in many cases, other than those to which the special rules apply relating to alibi, the defence does not disclose the identity of its witnesses until a late stage. It would place a substantial burden on the Crown for it to be expected to retain, and be ready to disclose at short notice, material which might possible relate to the credibility only of those whom the defence might possibly wish to call as its witnesses. It would also be unreasonable to expect the prosecutor to reveal information relating to the credibility of defence witnesses previously unknown to the Crown whose credibility did not require to be investigated until their identity was made known to the prosecutor. Yet, if there was a legal duty which required the disclosure of information relating to the credibility of the defence witnesses, there would be no answer to such a demand.

.........................................................................................................

Fairness, so far as the preparation of the defence case and the selection of the defence witnesses are concerned, is preserved by the existing rules of disclosure and by ensuring that the defendant has adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence. That right, which is to be found also in art 6.3(b) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Rome, 4 November 1950; TS71 (1953); Cmd 8969), has for long been part of our law relating to the conduct of criminal trials. The investigation for which the defence are responsible extends to all matters which may affect the credibility of the defence witnesses. The preparation of the defence case is not complete until this has been done. Once it has been completed, the defence can be assumed to be in possession of all that is needed to decide which witnesses to lead and which to reject on grounds of credibility. It is unnecessary to extend the duty of disclosure by the prosecutor any further to ensure that the defendant has a fair trial.".

"The administration of justice in Cyprus is modelled on the administration of justice under the common law judicial system, subject to this clarification: The autonomy and separateness of the Judiciary in Cyprus is entrenched by a written constitution. A Court of law has inherent power to control proceedings before it - R. v. Bloomsbury (1976) 1 All E.R. 897 (CA) - as well as restrain abuse of the judicial process - Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd, and Another (1981) 1 All E.R. 143 (HL). .................................................................

...........................................................................................................

Associated with the power to restrain abuse, is the undoubted power of the Court to control proceedings before it.

The Supreme Court has inherent power not only to restrain abuse of process but also to secure obedience to the law - Hammersmith v. Magnum Automated Forecourts (1978) 1 All E.R. 401 (CA). Its power may be exercised whenever the justice of the case so requires - A-G v. Chaudry (1971) 3 All E.R. 946 (CA)."

"Το Άρθρο 35 του Συντάγματος ορίζει ότι "αι νομοθετικαί εκτελεστικαί και δικαστικαί αρχαί της Δημοκρατίας υποχρεούνται να διασφαλίζωσιν την αποτελεσματικήν εφαρμογήν των διατάξεων του παρόντος μέρους, εκάστη εντός των ορίων της αρμοδιότητος αυτής." Το Δικαστήριο ελέγχει την τήρηση του Συντάγματος στο πλαίσιο δικαστικής διαδικασίας και αποφαίνεται ως προς την επίπτωση από τυχόν παραβίασή του. Η μή θέσπιση νόμου ως προς ζητήματα που σχετίζονται με τη συνταγματική επιταγή, την τήρηση και τις συνέπειές της, δεν διαγράφει το συνταγματικό δικαίωμα ούτε αδυνατίζει τη συνταγματική υποχρέωση του Δικαστηρίου να διασφαλίζει με τρόπο αποτελεσματικό το σεβασμό του μέσα στα όρια της αρμοδιότητάς του."