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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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Κυπριακή νομολογία στην οποία κάνει αναφορά η απόφαση αυτή:
THE REPUBLIC ν. NICOS DEMETRIADES AND ANOTHER (1973) 2 CLR 289
Μεταγενέστερη νομολογία η οποία κάνει αναφορά στην απόφαση αυτή:
Δεν έχει εντοπιστεί απόφαση η οποία να κάνει αναφορά στην απόφαση αυτή
(1987) 2 CLR 18
1987 February 28
[A. LOIZOU, DEMETRIADES. PIKIS, JJ.]
CRISTODOULOS PINGOURAS,
Appellant,
v.
THE POLICE,
Respondent.
(Criminal Appeal No. 4662).
Constitutional Law—Right to vote (Constitution, Article 31)—Compulsory exercise of—Not unconstitutional—consequently the provisions of sections 2 and 7 of the Village Authorities Law, Cap. 244, as amended by Laws 60/72, 60/76, 6/79 and 43/83, of section 13(A)(2) of the Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law, Cap.243, as amended by Laws 7/79 and 42/83, and of section 37(1) of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law 72/79 are not unconstitutional.
Constitutional Law—The Organic theory in respect of modem State—Electoral Body—A direct organ of the State—Right to vote—Rival theories—Its exercise is a State function—Legislator free to adopt such view— Consequently, legislator was free to make such exercise compulsory.
The appellant omitted to exercise his right to vote at the elections held on 6.5.84 for the election of Village Authorities and elected members of an Improvement Board and, as a result, he was charged and eventually convicted on two counts, namely for failing to discharge his electoral right contrary to sections 2 and 7 of Cap.244, as amended, and section 37(1) of. Law 72/79 and for failure to discharge his electoral right contrary to section. 13(A) (2) of Cap.243, as amended, and section 37(1) of Law 72/79.
The appellant's defence was that the aforesaid provisions, whereby the exercise of the electoral right was made compulsory, offend the Constitution and in particular Article 31 thereof, which reads as follows:
«Every citizen has, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and any electoral law of the Republic or of the relevant Communal Chamber made thereunder, the right to vote in any election held under this Constitution or any such Iaw.»
Held, dismissing the appeal: (A) Per A. Loizou, J. Demetriades, J., concurring: (1) The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus appears to adopt, the organic theory in respect of the concept of the State. The whole constitutional structure functions on the basis of it. Articles 6, 146, 139 of the Constitution refer to «organs or authorities» of the Republic and the term «organs or authorities in Article 139 received judicial interpretation in Celaleddin and Others v. The Council of Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C. 102.
(2) In modern democracies, the representative system prevails. All citizens have the right to participate in the exercise of political power through the representatives whom they elect in accordance with the law. In this way the electoral body constitutes the totality of the citizens and it is collectively a direct organ of the State.
(3) The question if the right to vote is individual or constitutes a State function, which is exercised, by the members of the electoral body has always been the subject of conflicting views.
(4) On the basis of the constitutional structure of Cyprus the legislator, as it had power to do, adopted the second solution. Once it is accepted that the question of the right to vote is an exercise of a State function, it is natural to conclude that the aforesaid provisions of the said Laws do not offend the Constitution. Article 31 of the Constitution establishes the minimum rights of the voter, but does not exclude regulation of their exercise by the Electoral Law and does not prohibit the adoption of compulsory voting.
(B) Per Pikis, J.: (4) It is not a task of this Court to make an evaluation in. abstractor of the merits of rival legal theories. The first question in issue concerns the interpretation of Article 31 in conjunction with the nature of the rights safeguarded as fundamental by Part II of the Constitution. The specific question is whether the Constitution prohibits the correlation of rights safeguarded by Part II with the imposition of any obligation for their exercise. The right safeguarded by Article 31 is individual in the sense that it rests in the person, not in a group of persons
(2) Not only the establishment of rights as fundamental does not preclude imposition of an obligation for their exercise, but the entrenchment of some of such rights, such as, the right of social security (Article 9), presupposes the imposition of such obligations.
(3) Obligatory voting is designed to reinforce the functioning of democracy an important constitutional objective. The underlying premise of democracy is the sovereignty of the people. The efficacy of democracy as an institution depends on the degree of participation of the citizenry in the political choices. In the modem State direct participation of the citizens in the decision making process is impossible. Compulsory voting at elections is designed to ensure that political authority emanates from the people and as such it is a safeguard of democracy.
(4) The theme of Article 31 is not the electoral system. Subject to certain conditions, the composition of the electoral law is left to the legislator. The matter of political choices offered to the elector is within the discretion of the legislator. Consequently, the omission to institutionalise the white ballot is not unconstitutional. What Article 31 safeguards and the Constitution viewed in its totality safeguards is the right of every citizen to vote at every election and the unobstructed exercise of this right achieved by secret ballot, an objective safeguarded by the Law.
(5) The Law under review is not unconstitutional. Consequently, the appellant was rightly convicted.
Appeal dismissed.
Cases referred:
Celaleddin and Others v. The Council of Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C. 102;
Muderrisoglou and Others v. The Council of Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C. 130;
Police v. Georghiades (1983) 2 C.L.R. 33;
Police v. Ekdotiki Eteria (1982) 2 C.L.R. 63;
Republic v. Demetriades and Another (1973) 2 C.L.R. 289.
Appeal against conviction and sentence.
Appeal against conviction and sentence by Christodoulos Pingouras who was convicted on the 26th June, 1985 at the District Court of Nicosia (Criminal Case No. 14682/84) on one count of the offence of failing to discharge his electoral duty contrary to sections 2 and 7 of the Village Authorities Law,. Cap.244 and section 37(1) of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law, 1979 (Law No.72 of 1979) and on another count of failing to discharge his electoral duty contrary to section 13A (2) of the Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law, Cap.243 and section 37(1) of Law 72 of 1979 and was sentenced by Kronides, S.D.J. to pay £10.- fine on each count.
Appellant appeared in person.
R. Gavrielides, Senior Counsel of the Republic, for the Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
The following judgments were read:
A. LOIZOU, J.: The appellant has been found guilty by the District Court of Nicosia of the following charges and he was sentenced on each one of them to £10.- fine. He was also ordered to pay the costs of the trial which amounted to £10.50 cents.
«1st Count. Failure of a voter to discharge his electoral right contrary to sections 2 and 7 of the Village Authorities Law, Cap.244 as amended by Laws 60/72,60/76,6/79 and 43/83 and section 37(1) of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law 1979 (Law No.72 of 1979).
Particulars of the offence. The accused on the 6th May, 1984 at Strovolbs in the District of Nicosia, whilst he was a voter under the age of seventy and resided at a distance of less than fifty miles from the electoral centre of Strovolos without reasonable excuse did not discharge his electoral right for the election of a Village Committee.
2nd Count. Failure of a voter to discharge his electoral right contrary to sections 13A(2) of the Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law, Cap. 243 as amended by Laws 7/79 and 42/83, and section 37(1) of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law 1979, (Law No.72 of 1979)
Particulars of the offence. The accused at the same time and place mentioned in count 1 whilst he was a voter under seventy years of age and resided at a distance of less than fifty miles from the Electoral Centre of Ayios Vassilios, Strovolos, without reasonable excuse did not discharge his electoral right for the election of members of the Improvement Board.»
The facts of the case as summed up in the judgment of the trial Judge are the. following. The appellant who is the holder of electoral book under number 066687 and resides at Santorinis street, No.3 in the quarter of Ayios Vassilios, Strovolos omitted to attend on the 6th May 1984, the Electoral Centre of Ayios Vassilios and vote for the election of members of the Village Authority and elected members of the Improvement Board. On the 21st July 1984, the appellant was formally charged in writing and the reply he gave after being cautioned was the following:
«What I did I did it in accordance with my conscience. My nonattendance at the aforementioned elections constitutes a political stand that is the defence of my right not to attend at elections as well as my right of a white ballot. The relevant safeguard of my rights exists in the given Cyprus Constitution and in Articles 39 and 62 as well as Article 31.1 shall put before the Court more extensively my defence of this right as well as that with all the means available to me for free expression.»
When he was called upon by the Court to make his defence after the close of the prosecution he elected to make a statement from the dock not on oath, adding that he has nothing to say except from his intention to address the Court on the constitutionality of the relevant statutory provisions on which the prosecution based the two counts against him.
On the basis of the evidence adduced which was not contested by the appellant it was not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that the accused omitted to vote at the Electoral Centre of Ayios Vassilios at Strovolos. Where he was regularly registered for the election of Village Authorities and elected members of the Improvement Board.
The defence was based on the challenge of the constitutionality of section 7, subsection 2 of the Village Authorities Law, Cap.244 as amended and section 37(1) of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives Law, 1979 and section 13(A)(2) of the Villages (Administration and Improvement) Law, Cap. 243 as amended.
It is useful at this stage to refer to the article of the Constitution and the relevant section of the Law.
Article 31 of the Constitution provides that:-
«Every citizen has, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and any electoral law of the Republic or of the relevant Communal Chamber made thereunder, the right to vote in any election held under this Constitution or any such law.»
Subsection 2 of section 13(A) of Cap.243 (amending Law 42/ 83), which is identical with section 7(2) of Cap.244 (amending Law 42 of 1982), provides that:-
«The exercise of the electoral right is compulsory.»
The appellant filed against his conviction this appeal and the only ground thereof is the unconstitutionality of the provisions of the Law which introduces the principle of compulsory vote.
In his long address the appellant contends that the electoral right is in accordance with Article 31 of the Constitution an individual right and as such belongs to all the citizens exercised freely by them and cannot be limited by legislation; that it could not by an ordinary Law be restricted nor could such a Law make the voting compulsory, which could only be done by an amendment of the relevant article of the Constitution. The reference of Article 31 to a Law, cannot allow the legislator to restrict the individual right of voting and at that to impose sanctions. He argued that the safeguard of the possibility of selection in Cyprus could be achieved by the existence of the optional vote and also of the white ballot and that the unconstitutionality of the Law is supported by the nonsafeguard of the white ballot.
He analysed the difference between the theories about the States, the one based on the principle of legality and the modern theories about the State which is based on the principle of democratic legality which aims at the wider possible and to the greatest degree enjoyment of individual rights, whereas the principle of legality, according to his view, leads to despodism or to the despodic State. He referred to the constitutional and other provisions which regulate the electoral right in countries like the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, France, where voting is optional based on the theory of the right to vote as individual right and not capable of being restricted. As regards the address of Mr. Gavrielides, the appellant pointed out that compulsory voting in Greece is regulated by the constitution and the note of interpretation added to it and not by legislation.
In his address learned counsel for the Republic submitted that Article 31 of the Constitution safeguards the right of the individual as a member of the Electoral Body to exercise his right of voting. On the basis 6f the Article, this right of the citizen to vote cannot be restricted but leaves to the Electoral Law the manner of his participation that is the exercise of the right to vote. He contended that the principle of compulsory voting which was established by virtue of section 37(2) of Law 72 of 1979, does not offend Article 31 but on the contrary it strengthens it. With the compulsory voting the voter has the legal obligation to vote. His obligation, however refers to the exercise of his right to vote and not to his obligation to exercise same in a specified manner, that is in favour of the one or the other candidate. In support of this stand he referred the Court to relevant passages from the textbooks of Antonopoullou Constitutional Law, Volume B, pp.29 and 35 and Manesi, the Safeguards of Observance of the Constitution II, p.245. He stressed that, in particular, the principle of compulsory voting lends support to the principle of universal voting which must govern the exercise of the right to vote. In other words by adopting this principle the function of the right of universal voting is supported, a principle which is established by Articles 39.1 and 63.1 of our Constitution. He further referred again to Manesis (supra) pp.240, 245, 246, 247, 248. He concluded his address with a reference to the work of A. Svolos, The New Constitution, pp.274, 275, where it is observed that «the adoption of the principle of compulsory vote contributed correctly to the political education of the people, to the restriction of the abstention from voting and beyond that to the achievement of universal voting.»
The learned trial Judge accepted the submission of counsel for the Republic that the right of voting constitutes a function of the State and consequently as such a function which carries with it the obligation of the citizen to exercise it. He quoted passages from the text-books to which he was referred and found the appellant, as it has already been mentioned, guilty, once he dismissed the submission that the relevant provisions of the laws were unconstitutional.
The theory of the organs in the modem State has been the subject of extensive studies and I consider it useful for the purposes of this judgment to deal only briefly with this subject. Suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus appears to adopt the organic theory and the whole constitutional structure functions on the basis of it.
Articles 6, 146, 139 of the Constitution refer to organs or authorities of the Republic. The term «organs or authorities in Article 139 has been the subject of judicial interpretation by the Supreme Constitutional Court in the case of Celaleddin and' Others v. The Council of Ministers, 5 R.S.C.C. 102 at p. 108, in which it was decided that organs or authorities are specific juridical creations bearing the features of individual and concrete organic institutions of government and functioning for and on behalf of a primary legal entity such as the Republic of Cyprus of which they are organs or authorities in the ordinary meaning of such terms.
So in the case of Muderrisoghu and Qthm v. The Council of Ministers, 5 RSCG, 130, it was found that the Turkish members of the House of Representatives, although by virtue of Article 78.2, of the Constitution have power to vote separately on certain matters, of legislation regarding the Electoral Law and Taxing Laws, are not considered that they constitute «organ or authority of the Republic that can invoke paragraph 3 of Article 139 of the Constitution,
In the modern democracies, the representative system prevails. All the citizens of the State have the right to participate in the exercise of political power under its various forms, that is through their representatives whom they elect in accordance with the Law in force at the time: In this way this electoral body constitutes the totality of the citizens and it is collectively a direct organ of the State.
Saripolos in his work, the Greek Constitutional Law 1915 Volume 1, p.274, states the following:
«The electoral body, the totality of the citizens in the narrow sense of the word, is a direct organ of the State and the electors organs-members. The State is the only subject of the voting right not the voter who has simply a defined by the State competence exercising a public function which, as such, never constitutes a right of the organ. A voter has only a right of public Law, according to the Constitution and the Electoral Law, to be recognised as member of the electoral organ of the State in order to exercise the electoral function of the State of as its own member. But this function is never that of the voter, like the functions, which according to the Constitution the King exercises, are not rights of Public Law in order to be recognised according to the Constitution as an organ of the State, so and the function of the voter is not his right but that of the State. The voter, however, having a right of public Law according to the Constitution and the electoral Law to be recognised as a member of the electoral organ.»
In Cyprus, the electoral body is provided by the Constitution, which defines also its competence. It is composed of Cypriot citizens who have the voting qualifications and are members of the Greek and Turkish communities, they elect separately the President and the Vice President of the Republic (Article 1) and the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives (Article.62.2). The qualifications of the voter are provided by the Constitution and supplemented by the Electoral Law. This electoral body is self sufficient in order to express its will, is not. dependant on any other organ and has not acquired its organic quality except directly from the Constitution.
The question if the right to vote is individual or constitutes a State function which is exercised by the members of the electoral body has always been the subject of conflicting views and authors on Public Law support the one or the other view, which second view, constitutes the omission to exercise the electoral right a criminal offence.
On the basis of the constitutional structure in Cyprus, the legislature adopted the second principle, as it has power to select, and gave to the electoral body functionally the principle of the universal vote of the equality of the vote, the direct voting in accordance with which the organs are elected directly from the voters without the intervention of other person or organ, the principle of secret voting and the principle of course of compulsory voting in accordance with which the voter must exercise his right to vote, otherwise he would be liable to criminal sanctions. Contrary to that in Greece where this principle is established by the Constitution, in Cyprus, this principle is established by the Electoral law as an expression of the will of the people. Article 31 of the Constitution establishes the minimum rights of the voter, does not exclude, however, the regulation of their exercise by the Electoral Law and does not prohibit the adoption of compulsory voting.
Once I have accepted that the question of the right to vote is an exercise of state function exercised by the members of the electoral body, it is natural to come to the conclusion that the - relevant provisions, the constitutionality of which has been challenged by the appellant in this appeal, do not offend any provision of the Constitution and consequently the expression of the will of the legislature cannot be considered contrary to any concrete constitutional provision, once the Constitution protects only the minimum right of the citizen of which he cannot be denied, but does not establish the right to refuse to exercise it by participating in any obligation which the Law would impose in this field.
In the result the appeal should be dismissed.
DEMETRIADES J.: I have had the opportunity of reading the judgment of my brother Judge A. Loizou with which I agree and I do not think that I need add anything.
PIKIS J.: The subject of this appeal is the constitutionality of the relevant provisions of the Village Authorities Law that impose, in conjunction with the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Representatives, a duty on every citizen registered in the electoral roll to vote at an election for the return of village authorities. Christodoulos Pingouras was convicted by the District Court of Nicosia and sentenced to a fine of £10.- for failure to discharge his electoral duty at the election for the return of the local authorities at Strovolos. Appellant pleaded not guilty and submitted that the provisions of the law making voting compulsory are unconstitutional on the ground that they conflict and are incompatible with the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution that safeguards the right to vote as right. The trial Court decided that Art. 31 does not rule out legislative power to make voting compulsory and consequently found Christodoulos Pingouras guilty of breach of his electoral duty.
The question is one of great constitutional importance because it concerns not only the right guaranteed by Art.31 but generally the character of fundamental human rights safeguarded by Part II of the Constitution, and further hinges on the workability of the democratic institutions of the country. Although the appellant is not an advocate, he made a serious research embodied in a comprehensive submission before the Court which together with the submission of Mr. Gavrielides, counsel for the Republic, had illuminated the subject from many angles.
The foremost objective of the appellant is, as I can infer, to obtain a judicial declaration on the character of fundamental freedoms and liberties with particular reference to the legislative amenity to correlate fundamental rights with the imposition of duties. Apparently the appellant refused to discharge the electoral duty cast upon him by the law in order to have the opportunity to contest the constitutionality of the obligation thereby imposed in the interest of fundamental and individual rights of the subject. Notwithstanding the decision to which I have arrived, for the reasons explained hereunder, entailing the rejection of his submission, I cannot but register my appreciation for the interest shown on his part to safeguard what he perceives to be fundamental human rights. The protection and entrenchment of freedom is to very large extent dependent on the sensitivity of members of the public for their rights and the determination with which they defend them by recourse to the Courts of law. The awareness of the citizen of his rights and readiness to assert them and those of his fellowmen constitute an irreplaceable safeguard for the supremacy of the law.
The rival positions of the parties affecting the nature and character of the right safeguarded by Art. 31 and amenity to make provision for the coincidence of a constitutional right with a legal obligation for its exercise, may be summed up as follows:-
Appellant's Position
The right to vote guaranteed by Art. 31 is individual, that is, its exercise is left solely and exclusively to the decision of the citizen. Any attempt to correlate its exercise with a legal obligation is antagonistic to the individual character of the right since it destroys the option of not exercising it; an option inherent in the right safeguarded by Art.31. The survey of the right to vote as an individual right is compatible with the theory of Rousseau, the great social philosopher of the French revolution, who contemplates the social contract as the bond that unites society through a series of individual rights as opposed to the organic theory of the State that depicts the union as emerging through the obligations of the citizens to society and visualizes the State as a separate organic entity.
Further the appellant submitted that compulsory voting as framed in the law is not only antinomous to the individual character of the right upheld by Art.31 but also fails to institutionalize the white ballot-paper (expressing no preference between the contestants) as a political choice to a degree that has given rise to the impression that casting a white ballot-paper constitutes an omission to discharge the obligation to vote.
Position of the Attorney-General
The right safeguarded by Art. 31 does not rule out the imposition of a legal obligation to exercise it. This proposition is in harmony with the contemporary theory of the State as an independent entity with autonomous mechanisms regulating its functioning. Participation is at the core of democracy and its effective functioning is dependent on the degree of participation. The citizens vested with the right to vote form the electoral body that constitutes an organ of the State. The operation of this organ is amenable to regulation by the legislature; a matter within its competence. The imposition of an obligation to take part in the elections ensures the functioning of the State and safeguards the sovereignty of the people. Montesquieu, a French Jurist, inclines in favour of the organic theory of the State as the safest means of safeguarding the rule of law. Other jurists too espouse the notion of the State as an independent legal entity with autonomous mechanisms governing its functioning.
Historical Review
Belgium was the first of the modem states to introduce compulsory voting by an appropriate provision in the Constitution of 1893. Compulsory voting was adopted in Greece in 1911 by a declaration of the Revisional Assembly of 1911 interpretative of Art. 66 of the 1864 Constitution; subsequently embodied in the Constitution of 1952. In most European countries and the U.S.A., voting is optional. In Italy, although participation in the elections is characterized as a duty, omission to discharge it does not entail penal sanctions.
Fundamental Rights and Liberties under the Constitution of Cyprus.
It is no task of the Court to make an evaluation in abstracto of the merits of rival legal theories. The mission of the judiciary is to identify and determine, within the framework of the Constitution the principles of law applicable to a particular dispute with a view to applying them for the resolution of judicial causes raised for adjudication. The first question we should address is the interpretation of Art.31 examined in conjunction with the nature of the rights safeguarded as fundamental by Part II of the Constitution, viewed within the context of the Cyprus Constitution. The specific question is whether the Constitution of Cyprus prohibits the correlation of rights safeguarded in Part II with the imposition of any obligation to exercise them. Their inclusion in a charter of fundamental rights does not of itself preclude the imposition of an obligation for their exercise. The rights are fundamental and consequently inalienable in the sense that no law, person or authority can take them away or deny them to man. The nature and character of fundamental freedoms and liberties was the subject of comprehensive examination by the Full Bench in Police v. Georghiades. The exercise of fundamental rights cannot be limited except to the extent to which such limitation is expressly permitted by the Constitution and then subject to and in accordance with the conditions envisaged in the Constitution as necessary for their limitation. The right safeguarded by Art.3l is individual in the sense that it vests in the person, not in a group of persons.
Not only the establishment of rights as fundamental does not preclude, provided it is found expedient by the legislator, the imposition of corresponding obligations for their exercise but the entrenchment of some of the fundamental rights safeguarded in Part II of the Constitution such as, the right of social security (Art.9), presupposes the imposition of obligations for their exercise.
Part II of the Constitution does not limit legislative competence to impose obligations for the promotion of constitutional objectives that are connected or identified with fundamental rights, subject always to the reservation that the imposition of an obligation for their exercise does not neutralize and does not defeat the individual character of the right, that is, the manner of its exercise by the individual. The decision of the Supreme Court in Republic v. Demetriades and Another explicitly acknowledges that a fundamental right may coincide with a legal obligation making its exercise compulsory whenever this is necessary for the workability of the institutions of the State, envisaged by the Constitution. It was decided that the duty imposed by law for the presence of an accused person at his trial in serious criminal cases, does not conflict with the individual fundamental right of the accused to be present at his trial. A fundamental right may coexist with an obligation to exercise it. Therefore, the accused could, as of right, be present at his trial in fulfilment of the fundamental rights safeguarded by the Constitution. At the same time he was bound to be present at his trial in the interest of the efficacious administration of justice. The conferment of the right entrenches the subject against arbitrariness, while the imposition of a duty safeguards the efficacy of the judicial process, another important constitutional goal.
Likewise obligatory voting is designed to reinforce the functioning of democracy, an important constitutional objective. The Constitution lays down that political authority be returned by direct voting on a basis of universal suffrage. The underlying premise of democracy is the sovereignty of the people. The efficacy of democracy as an institution depends on the degree of participation of the citizenry in the political choices. Democracy was institutionalized in ancient Athens as the polity of universal participation of the citizens in the affairs of the State. In the modem State direct participation of the citizens in the decision making process is impossible. Compulsory voting at elections is designed to ensure that political authority emanates from the people and as such is a safeguard for the sustenance of democracy.
The theme of Art.31 is not the electoral system and in fact this article does not deal with the form of elections. The Constitution leaves the composition of the electoral law to the ordinary legislator, subject to certain conditions affecting the qualifications for election to political office and the age of the electors. The Constitution does not predetermine the political choices that should be offered to the elector. The matter is in the discretion of the House of Representatives. Consequently, the omission to institutionalize the white ballot as a political choice does not conflict and is not inconsistent with the provisions of Art.31 or those of any other article of the Constitution. The institutionalization of the white ballot as a choice is a political matter exclusively referable to the competence of the legislative authority. What Art.31 safeguards and the Constitution viewed in its totality is the right of every citizen to vote at every election and the unobstructed exercise of this right achieved by secret ballot, an objective safeguarded by the law. No overseeing or supervision of the manner of exercise of the electoral right is permissible. The citizen is free to cast his vote in any way he chooses.
I conclude that the law under review providing for obligatory voting is not unconstitutional. Consequently the omission of the appellant to discharge his electoral obligations, defined by the law, constitutes the offence for which he was convicted. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.