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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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(1970) 2 CLR 185
1970 December 18
[VASSILIADES, P., JOSEPHIDES, HADJIANASTASSIOU, JJ.]
MATHEOS CHR. ARMEFTIS,
Appellant,
v.
THE POLICE,
Respondents.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3215).
Motor Traffic-Sentence-Disqualification--Disqualification order for six months for driving without due care and attention and for dangerous speeding-Sections 6, 13 and 4 (1) of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332-Numerous similar previous convictions-No merit in appellant's plea that inconvenience will be caused to him because he needs his driving licence in connection with his business-Trial Judge fully justified in making the disqualification order, in the circumstances of this case-Affirmed.
Disqualification Order-See above under "Motor Traffic".
Appeal against sentence.
Appeal by Matheos Chr. Armeftis who was convicted on the 3rd day of November, 1970, at the District Court of Limassol (Criminal Case No. 8947/70) on two counts of the offences of driving without due care and attention, contrary to sections 6 and 13 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332 and for driving a motor vehicle on a public road at a speed which was likely to endanger human life, contrary to section 4 (1) of the same statute and was sentenced by Kakathymis, Ag. D.J., to pay a fine of ₤10 on the first count, a fine of ₤10 on the second count and he was further disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for a period of six months.
Appellant in person.
M. Kyprianou, Counsel of the Republic, for the respondents.
The judgment of the Court was delivered by:-
VASSILIADES, P.: This appeal was taken upon a notice signed by the appellant-a Limassol grocer of about 54 years of age-and apparently prepared by him. The notice states that the appeal is taken against the conviction; but from the only ground on which the appeal was based, it is apparent that the appeal is directed against sentence; and particularly against the part of the sentence which consists of a disqualification for holding a driver's licence for some six months from the date of conviction. With the consent of all concerned, the appeal was treated as an appeal against sentence only.
The appellant was charged before the District Court of Limassol on two counts: (1) for driving without due care and attention contrary to sections 6 and 13 of the Motor Vehicles and Road Traffic Law, Cap. 332; and (2) for driving a motor vehicle on a public road at a speed which was likely to endanger human life, contrary to section 4 (1) of the same statute.
Appearing in person, on August 20th, 1970, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts. But at a subsequent stage in the proceedings, some two months later (owing to adjournments due to the appellant) the appellant appearing together with his advocate, applied for leave to change his plea; and when re-charged in the presence of his advocate, he pleaded guilty to both counts.
The facts of the case, as far as material to sentence, are simple. The appellant drives his own car, a specially constructed vehicle for a driver with an amputated right hand from above the wrist. He has been driving for over 30 years. On the evening of April 17, 1970 (at about 7.20 p.m.) the appellant was driving at considerable speed his rather powerful car, in an inhabited area of the town of Limassol. At a street crossing he came into collision with a cyclist, a schoolboy of about 12 years of age, who came into the crossing from a side street, riding his bicycle without a light. From the tyre marks found on the road by the police who investigated the case on the same evening, it appears that the appellant used his brakes before the collision in an attempt to avoid the bicycle; and then in order to stop his car. The plan prepared by the police, and produced at the hearing as an exhibit shows tyre marks caused by appellant's car on the asphalted surface of the road, running for some 108 ft. The boy was seriously injured; and was taken to hospital directly after the accident, by the appellant.
The count for driving without due care and attention was based on the evidence of eye witnesses. The count for dangerous speeding was based on the same evidence, supported also by expert evidence from tests carried out by the police with appellant's own vehicle. These indicated that appellant's car was travelling, at the material time, at a speed of over 60 miles per hour. The appellant, pleading through his advocate, blamed the cyclist for the collision; and as that matter is the subject of a civil claim, we do not wish to enter into it at all. We deal in this appeal only with the sentence imposed on the appellant after his plea of guilty to the counts in the charge.
In imposing sentence, the trial Judge took into consideration a list of previous convictions for motor offences, commencing from December, 1938. They were put to the appellant who admitted them. The list is before us as part of the record. During the last five years the list contains six convictions for motoring offences; one of them for driving without due care and attention in 1966 (for which the appellant was bound over in ₤30 for one year to keep the peace); one for using a car without the required insurance in September 1968, (for which he was bound in ₤30 for six months to come up for judgment); and a conviction, again in 1968, for exceeding the speed, for which the appellant was fined ₤5.
In this case, the learned trial Judge imposed a sentence of ₤10 fine on each of the two counts and disqualified the appellant for holding a driving licence for a period of six months, ending on May 1, 1971. The Judge gave as reason for the disqualification order, the numerous convictions of the appellant, particularly those connected with careless or dangerous driving and speeding.
The appellant, appearing before us in person, urgently pleaded for his driving licence which he badly needs, he said, in connection with his business. We appreciate the inconvenience in which the appellant is put by the disqualification order, but we find no merit in his plea. We take the view that in the circumstances of his case, the trial Judge was fully justified in making the disqualification order; and we think that he extended every possible leniency in limiting the period of six months only. We hope that the inconvenience and perhaps also the expense, which he will suffer, shall impress upon the appellant that if he wishes to hold a driving licence, he must change the manner in which he makes use of it.
This appeal is dismissed; and the sentence imposed by the trial Judge, including the disqualification order, is affirmed.
Appeal dismissed.