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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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(V17) 2 CLR 108
1944 June 28
[JACKSON, C.J., AND HALID, J.]
THE PANCYPRIAN SCHOOLMASTERS ASSOCIATION,
Appellants,
v.
MIKIS AGROTIS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS REGISTRAR OF TRADE UNIONS,
Respondent.
(Trade Union Appeal No. 1 of 1942.)
Trade Union-Refusal to register association as a trade union-Workmen- Teachers empl5yed by Government for the purposes of the Elementary Education Law, 1933-Trade Unions, and Trade Disputes Law, 1941.
The Registrar of Trade Unions refused to register the appellants, as a trade union, on the grounds, that schoolmasters are not "workmen within the meaning of the Trade Unions and, Trade Disputes. Law, 1941. No reference was made to the objects of the association or to any of its rules.
Held: "Trade Union" is" defined in section 2 of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941, by reference to the objects of the union not to the personnel. If by reason of the nature of his employment a person should be regarded as employed in trade or industry for the purposes of the Trade Unions Law, he should be so regarded whether his; employer employs him for profit or not Teachers employed by Government for the purposes of the Elementary Education Law, 1933, are "workmen" within the meaning of the Trade Unions Law.
Appeal under section 16 of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941, against the refusal of the Registrar of Trade Unions to register the appellants as a union.
G. Chrysafinis for the appellants.
P. N. Paschalis, Acting Solicitor-general, for the respondent.
The facts are set forth in the judgment of the Court which was delivered by:
JACKSON C.J.: This is an appeal by an association of persons, calling themselves "The Pancyprian Schoolmasters Association" of Cyprus, against the refusal of the Registrar of Tirade Unions to register the association as a Trade Union under the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941.
It appears from the rules of the association, furnished by them to the Registrar, that the association is composed entirely of "schoolmasters of the Elementary Education" as they, are called in the Rules.
These schoolmasters are employed by the Government of Cyprus a teachers in elementary schools for the purposes of the Elementary Education Law, 1933. They are appointed by the Government, which also determines the amount of their pay and pays them, and they are subject to the control of officers of the Government in accordance with the provisions of the law quoted.
A trade union is defined by section 2 of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941. Omitting particulars with which we are not now concerned, the definition runs as follows:-
"any combination, whether temporary or permanent, the principal objects of which are, under its constitution, the regulation of the relations between workmen and masters, or between workmen and workmen, or between masters and masters."
In the same section the term "workmen" is defined to mean "all persons employed in agriculture, trade or industry."
The grounds of the Registrar's refusal to register the association as a Trade Union, as stated by "him to the applicants under section 15 of the Law, were that "the schoolmasters are not workmen within the meaning of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941". No reference was made to the objects of the association or to any of its rules.
It will be seen at once that the Registrar's statement is ambiguous. It refers to "the schoolmasters" and it is not therefore clear "whether the ground of refusal was that these particular school masters, or teachers, as the Elementary Education Law more correctly calls them, were not "workmen", or that teachers as such could not be considered to be "workmen".
Both grounds, though they are quite different, were in fact maintained before us by the Acting Solicitor-General on behalf of the Registrar. He argued that these "particular teachers are not workmen because they are employed by the Government which, in this department of its activities, at any rate, cannot he said to he engaged in trade. Neither, therefore, can the teachers. He also argued that teachers as such, no matter by whom they are employed, cannot, by reason of the nature of their calling, be said to be engaged in trade or industry and are not, therefore, workmen within the meaning of the law.
The first point to notice is that trade union is defined in the Cyprus Law, as the English Acts, by reference to the objects of the union and not the personnel. The definition refers to "any combination" which has certain objects. It does not refer to combinations of workmen or of masters or of any particular class of persons. But the objects are limited and when the Registrar stated, as the ground of his objection to registration, that the teachers were not "workmen" he must be taken to have meant that the objects of the association are not objects for which the law authorizes the formation of a trade union, in that they include the regulation of the relations between persons other than workmen and masters or workmen and workmen.
The Trade Unions Law of 1941 is based upon a succession of English Acts passed between 1871 and 1927. In many important provisions the two laws are identical in expression.
One difference between the laws of the two countries is that in England registration of trade unions is not compulsory and in Cyprus it is. A trade union which cannot obtain registration under the Cyprus Law is, by section 18 of the Law, compulsorily dissolved. It is therefore especially necessary to ensure that refusal to register a trade union under the law is fully justified.
The current English definition of "trade union" is contained mainly in section 16 of the Trade Unions Act of 1876 and, though not identical with Cyprus definition, does not differ from it in any particular with which, this appeal is concerned. The current English definition of the term "workmen", for the purposes of the Trade Unions Acts, omitting particulars not now relevant, is "all persons employed in trade or industry". It is contained in the Trades Disputes Act of 1906.
We should draw attention to another point of difference between the law of England and the law of Cyprus. The "statutory objects" of a trade union in England are wider than they are in Cyprus. In England they include "imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade or business". In Cyprus they do not, and accordingly one finds, on reference to English authorities, that certain combinations of persons are registered as trade unions in England which would not be entitled to registration in Cyprus. We mention this point only as a caution to be borne in mind in searching the English authorities for examples of combinations admitted to registration.
In the case of Brimelow v. Casson (1924, 1 Ch. p. 302) the defendants represented certain associations of actors and musicians and the dispute related to the payment of a minimum wage. The associations had been registered as Trade Unions and it is evident, therefore, that the registration authorities had raised no objection based on the nature of an actor's or musician's calling. That objection was raised, however, at the hearing of the case. The plaintiff maintained that the defendants were not entitled to the protection of the Trade Unions Acts because acting is neither a trade nor an industry, nor are actors workmen. The Acting Solicitor-General used exactly the same argument about teachers and teaching in this case.
The learned judge, in the case quoted, went out of his way to express his opinion on that argument, for he actually decided the claim on other grounds. He described the plaintiff's argument as "a narrow view", and said he considered that "the business of presenting histrionic performances to the public for profit may fairly be described as a trade or industry in which many persons, including actors are employed".
We shall deal with the question of profit later, but it seems clear that neither the Registrar nor the judge found any ground in the nature of an actor's or musician's calling to exclude such persons from the definition of "workmen" in the Trade Unions Act.
It seems equally clear that both the registering authorities in England and the Courts will not permit any narrow interpretation of legal definitions in the Trade Unions Acts to restrict freedom of association, under the protection of those Acts, for lawful purposes.
So far as the actual calling of a teacher is concerned, we can find no reason in the Trade Unions Law to distinguish that calling from the calling of an actor or musician or to exclude from the benefits of that law, on the ground of a teacher's calling alone, associations formed to improve their conditions of employment.
It remains to consider whether, while teachers who work for their employer's profit must, in our opinion, be admitted to the benefits of the Law, there is sufficient justification to exclude those teachers working for an employer who makes no profit from their employment, but who employs them either in the discharge of a statutory duty, assumed in the public interest, or for some philanthropic or other purpose unconnected with any financial gain to himself.
It is evident that the material situation of the teachers is exactly the same in each case. They are equally dependent on their pay and conditions of employment for their livelihood and for their well-being, and if they are permitted to combine together for the protection of these things in one case, it is difficult to see why they should not be allowed to do so in the other. It is difficult to see why their right to combine should be made to depend, not on the objects of their combination, but on the ultimate motive of their employer in employing them, a circumstance which in no way affects the conditions of their employment and has nothing to do with them.
In the case of Brimeknv v. Casson, already quoted, the learned judge referred to the employer's profit because that element was present and put the matter beyond any doubt. But it by no means follows that his conclusion would necessarily have been different if that element had not been present.
If there had ever been any doubt, it would seem to have been removed by the English Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act, 1927. This was a restrictive act passed after the general strike in 1926. Some of its provisions are incorporated in the Cyprus Law and some are not. Included in the English Act are restrictions as to the organizations to which established civil servants may belong when the primary object of the organization is "to influence or affect the remuneration and conditions of employment of its members". One of these restrictions (there are others) is that the organization must be one of which the membership is confined to persons employed by or under the Crown. (Section 5).
It is clear from the act that, before it became law, established civil servants, like other persons employed by or under the Crown could freely join an ordinary trade union, that is to say, a trade union with the ordinary statutory objects, including the regulation of the relations between workmen and masters. There is, in fact, provision in the Act to enable established civil servants who previously belonged to an ordinary trade union to continue their membership in certain conditions. Even established civil servants, therefore, though they do not work for their employer's profit, must have been considered to belong, for the purposes of the Trade Unions Acts, to that class of persons, namely, "workmen", whose interests it is one of the statutory objects of a trade union to protect.
The positions of employees of the Crown other than established civil servants is not changed by the Act and they can still freely join an ordinary trade union. They do not work for their employer's profit but they were and are "workmen" within the meaning of the Trade Unions Acts.
Organizations of established civil servants must comply with the conditions which, the Act imposes. These organizations are not expressly called trade unions in the Act, but their primary object, "to influence or affect the remuneration and conditions of employment." of their members is the same as one of the main statutory objects of an ordinary trade union. They are, moreover, organizations of, which the structure is prescribed in an Act expressly relating to trade disputes and, trade unions and if they were not to enjoy the protection of the general trade union law, one would have, expected to find some express provision in the Act to say so.
It seems unnecessary to labour the point any further. So many reasons are to be found in the English Acts, and in English cases, in support of the conclusion at which we have arrived that it is difficult to choose between them. And we would not have thought it necessary to address ourselves, at such length to the question before us if it were not that the view taken by the Registrar of the appellants' application in this case suggests that there may be some advantage in a fuller discussion of the points involved than would otherwise be justified.
When we had already reached the conclusions that have now been stated we were informed by the Acting Solicitor-General that certain information regarding the practice of registration under the English Acts, which had not been available during the argument of this appeal, had been received. We accordingly restored this case to our list, with another in which similar points had been raised, in order that the parties in both cases might have an opportunity to put forward further arguments, if they so desired, on that, information.
We have taken those arguments into account and it is sufficient to say that they do not suggest any reason, in our opinion, to vary the conclusions that we had already reached.
The question before us is simply whether the appellants in this case, teachers employed by the Government for the purposes of the Elementary Education Law, 1933, are or are not "workmen" within the meaning of the Trade Unions Law, 1941; that is to say, whether they are or are not, for the purposes of that law, persons employed in trade or industry.
The calling, of workers by reason as employed in trade or industry, has been freely interpreted to include, for the purposes we are now considering, callings which are not commonly regrded as falling within those descriptions. On the same principle, we can see no legal or substantial justification for restricting, the workers freedom of association under the Trade Unions Law by making it depend on the ultimate motive, of their employer in employing, them.
We think that if, by reason of the nature of his employment, a person should be regarded as employed in trade or industry, for the purposes of the Trade Unions Law, he should be so regarded whether his employer employs him for profit or not.
For these reasons we direct the Registrar of Trade Unions to deal with the appellants' application for registration on the basis that the persons whose interests the association is intended to serve are workmen within the meaning of the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law, 1941. The appellants' costs must be paid by the respondent.
Appeal allowed.