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ΠΑΓΚΥΠΡΙΟΣ ΔΙΚΗΓΟΡΙΚΟΣ ΣΥΛΛΟΓΟΣ
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(1975) 1 CLR 340
1975 November 25
[TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P., STAVRINIDES, L. LOIZOU, JJ]
ANDREAS ORPHANIDES,
Appellant,
v.
IVI CH. SHIAMBELA,
Respondent.
(Case Stated No. 160).
Residential Premises (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 51 of 1974)-"Substantially affected" in the sense of section 5(1)(b) of the Law-Tenant-Public officer- All factors relevant to issue of "substantially affected" not considered by trial judge-No correct application of the law to the totality of all relevant facts-Loizides v. Ktimatiki Eteria Chr. Pantziaris Ltd. (reported in this Part at p. 333 ante) followed.
Cases referred to:
Loizides v. Ktimatiki Eterià Chr. Pantziaris Ltd. (reported in this Part at p. 333, ante).
Case stated.
Case stated by a District Judge of the District Court of Nicosia (Kourris,. S.D.J.) relative to his decision of the 29th May, 1975, in proceedings under section 4 of the Residential Premises (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 51/74), instituted by lvi Ch. Shiambela against Andreas Orphanides, whereby the latter was treated as having not been substantially effected as a result of the emergency.
G. Prountzos, for the appellant.
T. Eliades, for the respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
The facts sufficiently appear in the judgment of the Court delivered by:
TRIANTAFYLLIDES, P. : The present Case Stated arose out of a proceeding instituted, under section. 4 of the Residential Premises (Temporary Provisions) Law, 1974 (Law 51/74), by the respondent, as landlord, against the appellant who is her tenant.
In Case Stated No. 159, Loizides v. Ktimatiki Eteria Chr. Pantziaris Ltd., in which we have just given judgment today, we have dealt with the interpretation and application of section 5(1)(b) of the above Law and we do not propose to repeat what we have already said in that case; they should be taken as having been incorporated by reference in this judgment.
In the case now before us, once again the trial judge has, wrongly in our view, compared the amount deducted from the salary of the appellant, as a public officer, under the Emoluments (Temporary Reduction) Law, 1974 (Law 54/74), with the gross, instead of with the net, monthly emoluments of the appellant.
Also, the judge proceeded to take into account only the fact that as a result of the Turkish invasion, the appellant, who is a refugee from Famagusta, lost personal effects of his own, worth about C£50, and refused to take into consideration, too, that the appellant's wife and children lost, likewise, personal effects worth about C£250; the judge adopted this course because, in his view, the personal effects of the wife and of the children were not property of the appellant.
We cannot agree with the learned trial judge in the above respect; as we have pointed out in our judgment in Case Stated No. 159 Law 51/74 should be applied with an approach suited for achieving its object and it would amount to ignoring the realities of the matter before us if we were not to take into account that the appellant, as the head of his family and the person responsible for their expenses, has, indeed, suffered, in effect, himself financial loss, because of the Turkish invasion, through the loss of the personal effects of his wife and his children.
Furthermore, the trial judge refused to take into account the fact that the, father of the appellant has lost his job, as a result of the Turkish invasion, and that the appellant is contributing C£10 per month for his maintenance; in this respect, again, we cannot agree with the trial judge, because the said contribution by the appellant for the maintenance of his father is definitely a financial burden imposed on him as a result of the emergency created by the Turkish invasion and it ought to be taken into account as part of his overall financial position.
It is not for us to decide whether if all the factors, which the trial judge refused to take into account, had been considered by him as 'being relevant to the issue before him, the appellant ought to be treated as substantially affected in the sense of section 5(1)(b) of Law 51/74. It is for the judge to decide this on a correct application of the law to the totality of all the relevant facts. As in our view, for the reasons already stated, he has failed to do so, we allow this appeal by way of a Case Stated, with costs, and the case is remitted to the judge to be determined by him in the light of our opinion as expressed in this judgment.
Appeal allowed with costs.